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a b s t r a c t
Maritime accidents involving ships carrying passengers may pose a high risk with respect to human
casualties. For effective risk mitigation, an insight into the process of risk escalation is needed. This
requires a proactive approach when it comes to risk modelling for maritime transportation systems. Most
of the existing models are based on historical data on maritime accidents, and thus they can be
considered reactive instead of proactive.
This paper introduces a systematic, transferable and proactive framework estimating the risk for
maritime transportation systems, meeting the requirements stemming from the adopted formal
deﬁnition of risk. The framework focuses on ship–ship collisions in the open sea, with a RoRo/Passenger
ship (RoPax) being considered as the struck ship. First, it covers an identiﬁcation of the events that follow
a collision between two ships in the open sea, and, second, it evaluates the probabilities of these events,
concluding by determining the severity of a collision. The risk framework is developed with the use of
Bayesian Belief Networks and utilizes a set of analytical methods for the estimation of the risk model
parameters.
Finally, a case study is presented, in which the risk framework developed here is applied to a
maritime transportation system operating in the Gulf of Finland (GoF). The results obtained are
compared to the historical data and available models, in which a RoPax was involved in a collision,
and good agreement with the available records is found.
& 2013 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd.
1. Introduction
Maritime trafﬁc poses various risks in terms of fatalities,
environmental pollution, and loss of property. In particular,
accidents where ships carrying passengers are involved may pose
a high risk with respect to human casualties. Therefore a number
of studies on improvements to ship safety have been made; see for
example [1–6]. One of the outcomes of these studies is the concept
of risk-based design (RBD) for ships carrying passengers [7,8]
where the major criterion for RBD is the ability of a ship to survive
in damage conditions; see [9,10]. The above-mentioned studies
address ship design; however, less attention has been paid to the
risk-based design of ship operations. Although a general frame-
work for this purpose is provided by the International Maritime
Organisation – see [11] – few researchers have approached this
topic in a holistic manner; see [12–15]. These models rely on accident
statistics, and therefore the inﬂuence of factors contributing to the
risk can hardly be measured. Moreover, most of the models utilise
the concept of a fault tree (FT) or event tree (ET) following Boolean
logic [16–18], which in some cases may not fully reﬂect reality, as the
events being analysed may take more than just two states. Further-
more FT and ET allow one-way inference, which in turn may limit
their applicability in the ﬁeld of systematic risk mitigation and
management. The above limitations have been recognised in the
ﬁeld of Probabilistic Risk Assessment (PRA) in complex socio-
technical systems, where alternative, hybrid approaches have been
proposed, utilising FT, ET and Bayesian Belief Networks, see for
example [19–24]. However, for the domain discussed in this paper,
such solutions do not exist.
Therefore, it is desirable to develop a framework that evaluates
the risk to ships at the design and operation stage in a proactive
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and systematic way. This would allow an insight to be gained into
the process of risk evolution, as well as deﬁning the most
signiﬁcant and sensitive variables that contribute the most to the
risk in order to mitigate it in an optimal way, see [25,26].
Hence, this paper introduces a systematic, transferable and
proactive framework determining the risk resulting from an open
sea collision involving a RoPax. When it comes to describing the
evolution of the accident the framework attempts to capture the
causality, which makes the framework systematic. Its modular
nature allows continuous improvement and adaptation to various
locations and conditions, thus making its transferable. The frame-
work is developed using Bayesian Belief Networks (BBNs), as
recognised tools for knowledge representation and efﬁcient two-
way reasoning under uncertainty, which in turn makes the frame-
work proactive; see [27–29]. Moreover, BBNs allow reasoning in
both directions, pointing out the most vulnerable nodes and the
most effective ways of improving the outcome of the model. Thus
the back-propagation of the probabilities can be utilised in the
recommendation phase of risk assessment, see for example [30].
However, this is beyond the scope of this paper. All the above,
along with the quantiﬁcation of the effect of changes in the
assumptions on the outcome of the framework – see [31] – make
the results which are obtained more credible. Ultimately, the
framework communicates to the end-user the level of available
background knowledge about the system that is analysed, and
how it is distributed across the framework.
Moreover, BBNs allow the adaptation of a formal risk deﬁnition
following the well-founded idea of triplet given by Kaplan in [32].
Triplet attempts to answer the following questions: what can go
wrong in the system?; how likely is it that it will go wrong ?; and
what are the consequences if the assumed scenario occurs? This
idea has been widely used for risk assessment and management in
the maritime, see for example [33,34], which can provide addi-
tional justiﬁcation for its use for the purpose of this study. All the
relevant components of risk triplet are discussed here, and a case
study is presented that addresses the maritime trafﬁc system
(MTS) operating in the Gulf of Finland (GoF) during the ice-free
season, considering a speciﬁc RoPax as the struck ship.
The paper is structured into six main sections including the
introduction. Section 2 explains the use of BBNs to describe the
risk in the MTS, with the adopted risk perspective. Section 3
deﬁnes the risk framework, and Section 4 describes the elements
of the framework. In Section 5, the results obtained are shown,
discussed and compared with the available data. Section 6 con-
cludes the paper, focusing on the main ﬁndings and limitations of
the risk framework.
2. BBNs as reﬂection of risk perspective
A formal, and well-established deﬁnition of risk in decision
analysis is “a condition under which it is possible both to deﬁne a
comprehensive set of all possible outcomes and to resolve a discrete set of
probabilities across this array of outcomes”, see [35]. To deﬁne a set of
outcomes, knowledge and proper understanding of the system or
phenomena being analysed is a prerequisite. This in turn enables
scenarios leading to the outcome of interest and their probabilities to
be deﬁned. The framework aiming at risk analysis, which is presented
in this paper, is developed by means of BBNs. These probabilistic tools
allow reﬂection of the available knowledge on the process being
analysed and its understanding in a comprehensive way. First, the
aleatory uncertainties inherent to model variables are addressed, by
describing variables using distributions obtained in the course of
numerical analyses. Second, epistemic uncertainties related to model
structure are analysed by performing alternative hypotheses testing.
For this purpose, a set of scenarios is developed, with the constant set
of variables, but different, plausible hypotheses governing the links
between variables. This is performed for the elements of the model,
which, for various reasons, can not be quantiﬁed with desired
accuracy at the time of analysis. Beside quantiﬁcation of the uncer-
tainties the framework allows distributing them across the model.
By doing this, the crucial areas of the model are pointed, where the
limited background knowledge needs to be improved, as it has
signiﬁcant effect on an outcome.
Finally the framework communicates its output in a form of
diagram, which presents the cumulative distribution of likelihood
for the occurrence of number of fatalities given the scenarios.
By adopting this framework, and BBNs as tools for probabilistic
modeling, it is possible to apply modiﬁed risk perspective of
Kaplan [32], which for this paper reads as follows:
R¼ fðS; L;CÞjBKg ð1Þ
where S stands for a set of scenarios which comprises the same chain
of events, described by the same explanatory variables but the
variables and their relations can be described by adopting different
assumptions (alternative hypotheses). The latter depends on our
background knowledge of the process being analyzed – BK, see for
example [36]. L is a set of likelihoods corresponding to the set of
consequences C, for a given set of scenarios (S) and given combination
of anticipated assumptions governing the model parameters.
The above equation makes S, L, C conditional upon BK, which is
in line with the formal deﬁnition of risk provided in the ﬁrst
paragraph in this section, adapted from [35]. This implies the
necessity of quantifying the effect that BK, which for some variable
may be limited, has on R.
BBNs as probabilistic tools for reasoning under uncertainty are
capable of reﬂecting the analyzed scenarios along with assigning
the associated probabilities. This in turn leads to the quantiﬁcation
of the consequences. Moreover, the BBNs can effectively quantify
the effect of limited knowledge and imperfect understanding of
the analyzed system on the outcome of the framework.
This section discusses the main features of BBNs, stemming
from the formal deﬁnition of risk. It also claims the BBNs to be
suitable and proactive tools for risk evaluation in an MTS.
2.1. Background knowledge – BK
A clear representation of BK that is available about the given
system is relevant for any model which is intended for practical
use. This is especially important in the case of risk modelling in
MTS, where BK about the system being analysed is limited and
unequally distributed across the system. This, in turn, may
introduce varying uncertainties depending on the elements of
the system. This may result in a situation in which certain areas of
the modelled system may lack a sufﬁcient level of BK to satisfy the
adopted formal deﬁnition of risk. Therefore, it is desirable for a risk
framework to communicate the level of BK in order to determine
whether the risk results are informative and can be used for
decision-making, or should be used with great caution. The latter
may be the case if the uncertainties are greater than the margin
between the estimated risk and the risk limit. This may lead to
some early stage conclusions about the appropriate level of
granularity of the problem being analysed or the quality of BK,
or the information that is available.
BK can be reﬂected in a systematic way by constructing a risk
framework using BBNs. As a probabilistic graphical model, BBNs
allow reasoning under conditions of uncertainty, as well as in the
presence of limited data; see [37–39]. Additionally, BBNs can be
tested to ﬁnd the essential variables which have the greatest impact
on the output of the framework, and to determine which of these are
the most informative; see [40]. For this purpose, a sensitivity analysis
and a value-of-information analysis are performed. Moreover, as a
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result of the efﬁcient updating of the outcome of the BBNs, given
new knowledge on a variable or set of variables, the effect of changes
in the predeﬁned relations between variables, called likelihood
functions (LFs), can be quantiﬁed. In this paper, this is accomplished
by performing a so-called inﬂuence analysis. This analysis is espe-
cially important in the case of LFs which are not based on solid
foundations.
All of these analyses allow BBNs-based risk framework to
represent the level of available BK about the domain in question
in a transparent and systematic way.
2.2. Scenarios – S
A fundamental stage of any risk analysis, and one which affects
all the following stages, is scenario identiﬁcation. This includes
proper description of the knowledge about an MTS and its
behaviour in a certain situation (e.g. an accident befalling a ship).
This means that a risk framework should be capable of reﬂecting
the right variables in the right way, considering the associated
uncertainty along with a clear deﬁnition of the initial assumptions.
Moreover, it should be able to determine the effects of the
uncertainties and assumptions on the outcome of the framework,
see [25,41–43].
Most of the existing models adopted for risk assessment in
maritime transportation are deﬁned in a spatio-temporal, stochas-
tic framework; for a review of the models, see for example
[44–48]. However, these models often disregard causal relation-
ships between input variables (e.g. ship size, collision speed,
collision angle, relative striking location, and weather) and output
variables (e.g. the ship capsizing). These relations are hidden
under single probabilities (e.g. the probability of ﬂooding given a
collision or the probability of a severe collision) or probability
density functions (e.g. a PDF representing the extent of the
damage caused by a collision). This way of representing data
disregards the causality in the scenario, and therefore substantial
elements of risk analysis are missed, i.e. the links among variables
and their mutual relationship, see for example [42]. This ulti-
mately increases the uncertainty of the model.
However, some of the above-mentioned shortcomings of the
existing models can be addressed by applying BBNs to a risk-
analysis framework. First, BBNs allow multi-scenario thinking,
which not only focuses on an undesired end event (a collision)
but also provides insight into the process of the evolution of an
accident. Second, BBNs structure reﬂects the causality in the
process being analysed allowing further knowledge-based deci-
sion-making [49,30]. Third, BBNs can efﬁciently handle the uncer-
tainties about variables and the uncertainties about the relations
among variables, and represent those in the outcome.
2.3. Likelihood – L
In the ﬁeld of risk analysis in engineering systems, three methods
of interpreting the likelihood are usually followed: the relative
frequency, subjective probability and a mixture of these called the
probability of frequency; for discussion on these see, for example,
[32,50,51]. The BBNs described in this paper combine numbers
stemming from the ﬁrst two concepts, whereby the decision of which
to adopt was made with respect to the available knowledge. If the
latter permits, the frequentist approach is used, and a repetitive
experiment is conducted; otherwise the probabilities are derived
through the elicitation of knowledge from experts. The probabilities,
as mathematical concepts, follow certain axioms, which in some real-
life cases may not hold true; for discussion on the axioms and validity
of the given approaches, see, for example, [51,52].
The numbers derived from various sources are combined with
the use of BBNs, which encode the probability density function
governing a set of random variables by determining a set of
conditional probability functions (CPFs). Each variable is annotated
with a CPF, which represents the probability of the variable given
the values of its parents in the graph (PðXjpaðXÞÞAP). The CPF
describes all the conditional probabilities for all the possible
combinations of the states of the parent nodes. If a node does
not have parents, its CPF reduces to an unconditional probability
function, also referred to as a prior probability of that variable.
From a mathematical viewpoint, classical BBNs are a pair
N¼ fG; Pg, where G¼(V,E) is a directed acyclic graph (DAG) with
its nodes (V) and edges (E), while P is a set of probability
distributions of V. Therefore, BBNs representing a set of variables
and their dependencies consist of two parts, namely a quantitative
(P) and a qualitative (G). Therefore, a network N¼ fG; Pg is an
efﬁcient representation of a joint probability distribution P(V) over
V, given the structure of G following the formula; see also [27,28]:
PðVÞ ¼ ∏
XAV
PðX jpaðXÞÞ ð2Þ
In the framework described here, the CPFs were obtained through
simulation, a literature study, natural laws and expert opinions.
The CPFs are relevant elements of the framework; ﬁrst, they
govern the ﬂow of knowledge through the framework, and second,
they constitute a link between the qualitative and quantitative
parts of the framework.
3. Risk framework deﬁnition
This section describes the ﬁve-step procedure according to
[53], deﬁning the risk framework as follows:
1. deﬁning what to model;
2. deﬁning the variables;
3. developing the qualitative part of the framework;
4. developing the quantitative part of the framework;
5. validating the framework.
3.1. Deﬁning what to model
The aim of the proposed framework it to estimate the risk in
MTS, focusing on selected accidental scenarios that, ultimately,
lead to the loss of a struck RoPax ship. These scenarios are (i) the
inner hull of the RoPax that is struck is breached and consequent
ﬂooding is experienced; this can result further in the loss of the
ship; (ii) the RoPax that is struck has no signiﬁcant hull damage;
however, the ship is disabled and drifts, thus experiencing sig-
niﬁcant rolling as a result of wave and wind action, which can
result further in the ship capsizing. The loss of the RoPax is
expected if two consecutive limits are exceeded, namely crash-
worthiness and stability.
Subsequently the corresponding probabilities of the limits
being exceeded given the trafﬁc and environmental conditions
are evaluated on the basis of the model presented here. For this
purposes the following general factors are taken into considera-
tion: the composition of the maritime trafﬁc in the sea area being
analysed, the collision dynamics, hydrodynamics of the ship and
her loading conditions.
Ultimately, the cumulative number of fatalities (N) resulting
from an accident is modelled utilising the concept of the rate of
fatalities. This rate is determined taking into account time for
evacuating a ship and time for a ship to capsize. The number of
passengers on board is modelled utilising available data from
RoPax operators from the Gulf of Finland. All these, along with the
associated probabilities (P) for a given number of fatalities, are
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ﬁnally depicted in a FN diagram, which can be considered as a
risk picture.
3.2. Deﬁning the variables
The framework presented here attempts to reﬂect the causality
in the process of open-sea collision that is being analysed by
deﬁning the relevant variables and constructing logical relations
between them. Thus the framework consists of four major parts,
covering the following areas: (i) collision-relevant parameters; (ii)
capsizing-relevant parameters; (iii) the response to an accident;
(iv) quantiﬁcation of the consequences. These are described
further in Section 4, and are depicted in Fig. 1. The collision-
relevant parameters are obtained from a maritime trafﬁc simula-
tor, which utilizes AIS data and accident statistics for the Gulf of
Finland, see Section 4.1. Ship capsizing is conditional upon various
events, of which the most relevant are (i) the collision speed and
angle for the given ship mass ratios, leading to the rupture of the
inner hull of a struck RoPax conditional upon a collision; (ii) the
extent of damage leading to the signiﬁcant ingress of water,
conditional upon the inner hull being ruptured; (iii) the hydro-
meteorological conditions contributing to the ship capsizing given
the signiﬁcant ingress of water; (iv) the maximum roll angle at
which a disabled, intact RoPax capsizes. All these are obtained
with the use of ﬁnite element simulations, a six-degrees-of-
freedom ship motion model, and the available literature.
The response to an accident means the evacuation time or time
needed for rescue tugs to arrive to the accident place. The former
is modelled adopting the IMO requirements. The latter with the
use of maritime trafﬁc simulator and available data about the
location of the rescue tugs in the area.
The consequences of an accidents are modelled with the use of
a concept of the rate of fatalities, as described in Section 4.13.1.
3.3. Developing the qualitative part of the framework
In this step, the graphical structure of the network is created.
As available accident databases are scarce with respect to the
consequences for a RoPax ship that is struck by another ship,
another source of information must be found. We decided to
utilise the qualitative part of the existing ET-based risk framework
for RoPax, see [3,54], and confront it with expert knowledge about
the domain.
As the domain under study is wide and multidisciplinary, we
divided it into the following sections: (i) ship operations, including
the stability of the ship, (ii) the structure of the ship, and (iii)
accident response.
Expert knowledge about the domain was elicited through a
brainstorming session as well as individual meetings. During the
session, the initial structure of the model was presented to the
experts for assessment, and was then modiﬁed according to their
suggestions. The group of experts consisted of 15 researchers and
practitioners in the ﬁelds of ship design, ship operation and rescue
services. Once the structure of the model had been deﬁned, the
quantitative part of the model was determined.
3.4. Developing the quantitative part of the framework
The number of probabilities required for a BBN depends on the
structure of the network and the number of variables and their
states, and it grows exponentially. To reduce the number of
probabilities that need to be determined to evaluate the frame-
work, the parametric probability distributions (PPDs) for the
variables were used. These provide simple computation rules for
obtaining the required probabilities; see [29]. All the PPDs applied
in the model are described in detail in Section 4.
A complete list of the model variables and their PPDs is
presented in Appendix A in Table A1, which also lists the data
sources for the variables.
3.5. Validating the framework
At this stage, the risk framework is validated by performing the
following; see also [40]: sensitivity analysis of the framework,
value-of-information analysis, inﬂuence analysis and a comparison
of the results obtained with the available data. This stage is
important in the context of the reliability and validity of the
framework, and knowledge distribution and uncertainty analysis
in the framework and its output; see [55,43].
The lack of BK about the analyzed system leads to uncertainty
in the model parameters and affects the hypotheses supporting
the model structure. There are numerous ways to address
and express the model uncertainty, see for example [56]. The risk
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Fig. 1. The qualitative description of the risk framework introduced here. At each variable the reference to a section which describes a given variable is provided. (For
interpretation of the references to color in this ﬁgure caption, the reader is referred to the web version of this paper.)
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framework introduced here allows for the effect of uncertainties
related to BK being evaluated in two-fold. First, by analyzing
aleatory uncertainties of the variables. For this, the relevant
variables are considered as distributions and the analysis is
performed for a range of parameters that these distributions can
take. Second, epistemic uncertainties related to model structure
are analysed by performing alternative hypotheses testing. For this
purpose, a set of models (BBNs) is developed, with the constant set
of variables, but different, plausible hypotheses governing the
links between variables. In addition to quantifying the uncertain-
ties, the framework allows for their distribution across the model.
By doing this, the crucial areas of the model are identiﬁed. In these
areas the limited BK must be improved, as it has signiﬁcant effect
on the outcome.
If the framework is used for analysing the risk in a speciﬁc
maritime transportation system, the sensitive variables should be
evaluated locally in order to reﬂect the actual conditions. However,
if this is not possible, the framework allows the quantiﬁcation of
the effect of underlying assumptions on the outcome of the
framework. The remaining less sensitive variables of the frame-
work can be more generic, as changes to them do not affect the
outcome signiﬁcantly.
4. Risk framework aggregation
This section describes the methods adopted to determine the risk
framework, meaning the variables and the relations among them.
It also presents the results of the performed case study, which
focused on the MTS operating in the Gulf of Finland (GoF). Although
the results are valid for the maritime trafﬁc composition and hydro-
meteorological conditions prevailing in the GoF, the methods applied
are generic and the modularity of the framework makes the
approach presented here fully transferable. The framework is
encoded with BBNs, developed by means of an available software
package called GeNIe; see [57,58]. The qualitative description of the
framework is given in Fig. 1, where each variable is annotated with
the reference to a section which describes this variable. Moreover,
three colours are used to make a distinction between variables which
are obtained from the numerical simulations (blue), taken from the
literature (yellow), based on certain assumptions (grey) or purely
conditional on their parents (without ﬁlling).
The framework captures the accidental scenario, where a RoPax
is struck by another ship in the open-sea. The collision is described
by collision angle, collision speed and masses of colliding ships and
relative striking location along a hull. Potential locations of an
accident and collision related parameters are obtained from a
maritime trafﬁc simulator. To determine whether the inner hull of
a RoPax is ruptured following the collision, the critical speed is
calculated with the use of numerical model and then it is compared
with the actual collision speed. If a collision speed is higher than
critical speed, a hull rupture is expected. Then the framework
estimates whether the damage can cause catastroﬁc ﬂooding.
If this is the case, the model estimates the probability for a ship
to capsize along with time to capsize. A RoPax may also capsize
even if she is intact, if she is exposed to wave action. Therefore, the
probability for a RoPax which is intact but disabled due to post-
collision damage to her propulsion is calculated with the use of ship
dynamic model. For the probability and time to capsize, a set of
stability conditions is considered along with the wave character-
istics typical for the GoF. The time needed to evacuate the RoPax is
modelled with the use of IMO recommendations, which leads to
quantiﬁcation of the rate of fatalities, given collision and ﬂooding.
This, together with the number of people on board, estimates the
cumulative probability (F) of a given number of fatalities (N). The
framework delivers its output in a form of FN diagram, which is
recognized way of risk visualization.
This section provides description of all variables included in the
framework.
4.1. Collision probability
In the case study presented here, the probability of a collision
between two ships in the open sea in which the RoPax is struck by
another ship is estimated by means of the dynamic maritime trafﬁc
simulator (DMTS), developed by Goerlandt and Kujala in [45].
Additionally the accident statistics compiled for the GoF are utilized.
The input to the DMTS is taken from the Automatic Identiﬁcation
System (AIS), augmented with harbour statistics concerning the
cargo types that are traded. The model determines the annual
frequency of a collision between two ships assuming a RoPax being
struck for the whole GoF, as if ice-free conditions were year-round.
The annual frequency of such an accident equals 0.1. This means that
a collision inwhich a RoPax is involved would happen every 10 years,
if there were ice-free conditions year-round. However, this is not the
case for the GoF, therefore more realistic assumptions are made that
the ice is present every year and remains there for 3 months. This
means that the annual frequency for an open-sea collision in which a
RoPax is struck equals 0.07, and the reoccurrence period for such an
accident is 14 years.
However, the available accident statistics which are compiled for
the GoF reveal that the annual frequency of the collisions between two
ships at sea, regardless of ship type and ice conditions is 0.2; see [59].
Then, attributing equal chances of being struck and striking to a ship
involved in a collision, the annual frequency for a ship being struck,
regardless of her type, given a collision is 0.1. Assuming that the ratio
of RoPax ships to the number of other ships navigating in the GoF is
1:10, the annual frequency of a RoPax being struck in a collision yields
0.01. Assuming, period of 3 months, during which the GoF is frozen,
Fig. 2. The modelled locations of an accident in which a RoPax is the struck ship.
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the frequency of an open-sea collision, where a RoPax is struck is
0.0075.
Thus, two numbers for the annual frequency of an accident in
the open-sea in which a RoPax is struck are obtained, 0.07 from
the DMTS, and 0.0075 from the accident statistics. However, both
values are burdened with some amount of uncertainty, due to
assumptions in the DMTS or simpliﬁcations in reasoning from the
accident statistics. Therefore it is assumed that the “true fre-
quency” might fall between these two numbers, and they are
considered as limits for a uniform distribution estimating the
probability of an open-sea collision, where a RoPax is a struck
ship; see Eq. (3).
The most likely locations of such an accident are depicted in
Fig. 2, and the simpliﬁcation is made about lack of correlation
between time of day and collision:
Pcoll ¼
1
0:070:007 ; 0:007rxr0:07;
0; xo0:007 or x40:07
8<
: ð3Þ
4.2. Collision parameters
Another item of information derived from the DMTS concerns
maritime trafﬁc data in terms of the composition of the trafﬁc,
ship types, ship sizes, collision angles, collision speed and the time
of day of a potential collision. These are essential input for the risk
framework presented here, as they describe in detail the tempo-
spatial layout of trafﬁc. The DMTS generates a trajectory for each
single vessel sailing in the area, called a trafﬁc event, and assigns a
number of parameters to this event, as illustrated in Fig. 3.
The trafﬁc events modelled by the DMTS are based on data
which refer to the normal operation of ships, ultimately resulting
in safe navigation. Therefore, the modelled motion parameters of
ships on a collision course (their speeds and courses) do not
account for the changes caused by evasive manoeuvres intended
to forestall a collision. To ﬁll this gap, a two-step procedure is
applied to determine the collision speed. First, the initial value of
this parameter is obtained from the DMTS, and then it is
considered as the input value for the statistical models, thus
arriving at the actual collision speed. There are several different
statistical models for estimating the collision speed and collision
angle; see [42]. However, only one, proposed by Lützen in [60],
takes into account the changes in the initial parameters resulting
from evasive action taken by the colliding ships. Therefore, this
concept is applied here with the following assumptions:
1. the velocity of a striking ship A follows a uniform distribution
for velocities between zero and 75% of her initial speed,
then the probability decreases triangularly to zero at her
initial speed;
2. the velocity of a struck ship B is approximated by a triangular
distribution with the most likely value equal to zero and a
maximum value equal to her initial speed;
3. the initial speed values of A and B are obtained from the DMTS;
4. the collision angle, deﬁned as the difference in the headings of two
colliding ships, is uniformly distributed between 101 and 1701.
Then, applying the four-step random sampling Monte Carlo
procedure, the distribution of the actual collision speed is esti-
mated as follows:
1. sample the initial speed of a striking ship obtained from the
MDTS, then use it as an input to determine the appropriate
uniform-triangular distribution; subsequently sample the
speed from this distribution randomly, and store it as VA;
2. sample the initial speed of a struck ship obtained from the
MDTS and use it as an input to the triangular distribution;
subsequently sample the speed from this distribution ran-
domly, and store it as VB;
3. randomly sample the collision angle α from the uniform
distribution;
Fig. 3. Data generated for each simulated vessel, a trafﬁc event [45].
Fig. 4. Deﬁnition of collision speed – V ðA;BÞ .
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Fig. 5. The CDFs of variable collision speed – labelled as CS in the graph –
conditional upon the collision angle adopted in the BBNs developed here.
Table 1
The continuous probability distributions for vari-
able collision speed, given the collision angle.
Collision angle (deg) Collision speed (kn)
10–45 CS1¼N(2.35, 1.64)
45–135 CS2¼N(10.86, 8.26)
135–170 CS3¼N(14.2, 5.53)
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4. knowing the VA, VB and α, calculate the relative speed at which
ship A hits ship B, consider it as the collision speed, [61] and
store it as V ðA;BÞ; see Fig. 4.
For each collision encounter obtained from the DMTS, the above
procedure is run repeatedly, and a set of collision speeds given a
certain collision angle is arrived at. Then, all the collision speed
values that have been obtained are ordered according to the
collision angle and are divided into three sub-sets: 10–451, 45–
1351, and 135–1701. Subsequently, the sub-sets are described with
the use of normal distributions, which are the best-ﬁts, see Fig. 5.
Finally, these distributions are embedded into the BBNs presented
here, as demonstrated in Table 1.
4.3. Rupture of the inner hull of the RoPax
The value of the actual collision speed is one of the inputs to a
function determining whether the inner hull of a RoPax is
ruptured (ihr); see Eq. (4). The other input is the structural
capacity of the ship being analysed, described by the function
called limiting speed – Vrupture, which is a speed leading to inner
hull rupture. This parameter is evaluated with the use of a
numerical model, which is described in this section.
The relation between the collision speed – V ðA;BÞ – and the
limiting speed – Vrupture – is given by the following Heaviside
function:
ihr¼
0; V ðA;BÞoVrupture
1; V ðA;BÞZVrupture
(
ð4Þ
The Vrupture quantity is a function of the sizes of the colliding ships,
the striking angle and the relative striking location along the hull
of a struck RoPax. This quantity is determined using the concept of
collision energy, which is evaluated for the reference RoPax; see
Table 2. In the case study presented here, the following sizes of the
striking ship are considered with respect to the struck RoPax: a
similar size (mass ratio 1.0), a ship that is 25% smaller (mass ratio
1.33), a ship that is 25% larger (mass ratio 0.8) and a ship that is
70% larger (mass ratio 0.6). Therefore the mass ratios that are
analysed cover almost 80% of maritime trafﬁc in the GoF. The
remaining share belongs mostly to ratios higher than 1.3 and
lower than 0.6, which are not taken into account in the numerical
analysis. Ratios higher than 1.3 can be assumed to be less critical
concerning a hull rupture for the usual blunt bow shapes. How-
ever, ratios lower than 0.6 shall not be neglected, thus despite the
fact that they are excluded from the numerical analysis, they exist
in the risk model. The conservative assumption is made that in any
case where the ship masses ratio is lower than 0.6, the inner hull
of a RoPax is breached, if the collision speed is higher than 80% of
the limiting speed for the ratio 0.6.
ihrðratioo0:6Þ ¼
0; V ðA;BÞo0:8Vrupture ðratio¼ 0:6Þ
1; V ðA;BÞZ0:8Vrupture ðratio¼ 0:6Þ
(
ð5Þ
The available energy for structural deformations is obtained
according to the calculation model introduced by Tabri in [62]. His
model estimates the dynamics of a ship collision and the share of
energy available for ship motions and structural deformations. As a
result of the combination of this dynamic simulation procedure
and the non-linear ﬁnite-element method, a good estimation of
structural damage in various collision scenarios with oblique
angles and varying eccentricities of the contact point can be
achieved, see also [63]. The simulated collision scenarios, deﬁned
by the striking angles and relative striking locations along the hull
of the RoPax, are depicted in Fig. 6.
For the purpose of collision simulations, the LS-DYNA solver
version 971 is used, and the ANSYS parametric design language is
used to build the ﬁnite-element model of the reference RoPax
vessel. A three-dimensional model is built between two transverse
bulkheads of the midship section, spaced 26.25 m apart – see
Fig. 7 – and not accounting for differences in the ship structures
present along the length of the ship. Moreover, the translational
degrees of freedom are restricted in the plane of the bulkhead
locations, whereas the remaining edges are free. The structure is
modelled using four-noded, quadrilateral Belytschko–Lin–Tsay
shell elements with ﬁve integration points through their thickness.
The characteristic element length in the contact region is 50 mm
in order to account for non-linear structural deformations, such as
buckling and folding. The element length-dependent material
relation and failure criterion according to [64] are utilised for the
simulations. Crashworthiness simulations employing this material
model have been found to be sufﬁciently accurate compared to
large-scale experiments; see [65]. Standard LS-DYNA hourglass
control and automatic single surface contact (with a friction
coefﬁcient of 0.3) are used for the simulations. Moreover, the
collision simulations are displacement-controlled.
The rigid bow is moved into the side structure of the ship in a
quasi-static fashion. Hence, this approach results in the maximum
absorption of energy by the side structure alone, which is needed
for a comparison and can be considered conservative and there-
fore suitable for fast prediction. Moreover, two draughts are
considered for the struck ship, which are a function of the
maximum variations in draught to be expected for this kind of
vessels. Therefore the maximum striking location is positioned
close to the ﬁrst deck, and the second striking location is located
closer to the tank top. Then it as assumed that both locations are
equally probable and thus take the average response.
As a result, the relative energy available for structural deforma-
tions as a function of the longitudinal striking location is obtained
for a mass ratio of 1.0; see Fig. 8. For mass ratios of 1.33 and 0.6,
these curves are scaled with the factors 0.84 and 1.13, respectively,
to account for the change in dynamic behaviour. Therefore, the
values of Vrupture for a given mass ratio, striking angle and striking
location along the hull of the struck ship, causing a breach of her
inner hull, are evaluated; see Table 3.
Table 2
The characteristics of the RoPax vessel that was
analysed.
Length 188.3 m
Breadth 28.7 m
Average draught 6.0 m
Displacement 19 610.0t
Fig. 6. Relative striking locations and striking angles analysed.
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Finally, the probability of the inner hull rupture given a
collision – Pihr – is obtained with the use of the framework
introduced here. For the case study analysed here, it yields
Pihr ¼ 0:61.
4.3.1. Masses of colliding ships
In the case study presented here, the masses of colliding ships
are obtained from the DMTS, and then modelled with the use of a
log-normal distribution with the following parameters: μ¼0.25
and s¼0.70.
4.3.2. Relative striking location
Relative striking location is modelled with the use of a uniform
distribution. This means that any location along the hull of a RoPax
is equally probable for being hit by the striking ship. Thus, the
limits for this distribution are 0.5 (the most aft part of the
RoPax) and 0.5 (the most forward part of the RoPax); see Fig. 6.
4.4. Collision angle signiﬁcant
It is assumed that the collision angles falling in a range
between 451 and 1351 may lead to a rupture of the inner hull of
a RoPax, and thus they are considered relevant, see also [66].
Therefore the collision angle from this range is referred to as α
signiﬁcant (αsign). This assumption corresponds to the range of
striking angles adopted in the FEM-based RoPax crashworthiness
experiment, which is described in the previous section.
Nevertheless, the effect of a change to this assumption on the
outcome of the framework and relevant intermediate variables is
determined at the validation phase of the framework.
4.5. Capsizing of a damaged ship as a result of ﬂooding
As a result of a ship–ship collision in which the collision speed
exceeds the limiting speed for a given RoPax in given scenario
(size of colliding ship, collision angles and location), the ingress of
water can be expected. This, in turn, can bring the damaged ship
being analysed towards the boundaries of her stability limit. In the
risk framework presented here, it is developed utilising the
concept of a “capsize band,” determined on the basis of numerical
simulations that consider characteristics of the ship, her loading
conditions and environmental properties as explanatory variables.
The band is determined for a given ship, as a function of wave
height (H) and ship stability (stab); it also takes dynamic time-
variant ﬂooding characteristics into consideration, see [67,68].
Within the band a transition between two states, namely “safe”
and “unsafe,” takes place, according to the logic presented in
Eq. (6). The band begins at a wave height that does not cause the
ship to capsize (Hcapsize ¼ 0) and ends at the wave height where the
loss of the ship is always expected (Hcapsize ¼ 1). The capsize
boundaries are symmetrical around the value of the critical wave
height (Hcritical), which corresponds to the probability of capsizing
equal to 0.5. The band is estimated with the use of a sigmoid
function (S). This logic is captured by the following function:
PcapsizeðstabÞ ¼
0; HoHcapsize ¼ 0ðstabÞ
SðHcriticalÞ; Hcapsize ¼ 0ðstabÞrHrHcapsize ¼ 1ðstabÞ
1; H4Hcapsize ¼ 1ðstabÞ
8><
>:
ð6Þ
For a detailed description of the concept the reader is referred to
[6,69].
The framework presented here assumes that the ﬂooding
contributing to the loss of the ship occurs if the wave is higher
than a critical height, and at least the main car deck and two
compartments beneath are ﬂooded, which corresponds to the
accident scenario adopted in the previous work of Papanikolaou
et al. presented in [6]. For the purpose of this study, wave data
for the sea area that is analysed is shown in Table 5. Four equally
likely stability conditions of a damaged RoPax are assumed, si,
where i¼1–4. They correspond to the following Hcritical ½m ¼
½2:0;2:5;3:5;5:5, with appropriate bandwidths around each
Hcritical, see Table 4. For a detailed description of the ship condi-
tions and method, the reader is referred to [6].
Fig. 7. FEM model and vertical striking locations.
Fig. 8. Relative available deformation energy versus relative striking location and
striking angle.
Table 3
The values of the structural capacity for a RoPax, expressed by limiting speed – in knots
– as a function of the relative striking location and striking angle, mass ratio 1.0.
Relative striking
location
Striking angle (deg)
45 30 15 0 15 30 45
0.4 8.20 8.40 8.50 8.61 8.33 8.07 8.20
0.3 7.63 7.73 7.73 7.73 7.60 7.48 7.57
0.2 7.22 7.20 7.16 7.12 7.05 6.99 7.16
0.1 6.88 6.82 6.76 6.70 6.70 6.71 6.99
0.0 6.73 6.64 6.60 6.56 6.62 6.68 7.01
0.1 6.70 6.68 6.69 6.70 6.78 6.88 7.16
0.2 6.84 6.91 7.01 7.12 7.20 7.29 7.57
0.3 7.07 7.73 7.52 7.73 7.81 7.90 8.14
0.4 7.48 8.01 8.29 8.61 8.61 8.61 8.92
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Finally, the conditional probability of a RoPax exceeding her
stability limits resulting in ship capsizing is obtained – Pcapsize. For
the case study being analysed here, it yields Pcapsize ¼ 0:17.
4.6. Damage extent signiﬁcant
The damage stability conditions analysed in this paper consider
a RoPax experiencing the ﬂooding of certain compartments, which
are the main car deck and two of the compartments beneath.
However, not every hull breach results in such severe effects, and,
therefore, the conditional probability of the damage size (des)
allowing critical ﬂooding is estimated by considering the mass
ratio of the ships colliding, the collision speed and collision angle,
adopting the following function:
des¼ 1 ANDðihrÞ ¼ 1; αsign ¼ 1; V ðA;BÞ41:2Vrupture
0 otherwise

ð7Þ
Here, the collision speed leading to signiﬁcant damage is taken as
120% of the structural capacity for a RoPax, deﬁned by the limiting
speed, introduced in Section 4.3. The collision angle contributing
to signiﬁcant damage is called collision angle signiﬁcant (αsign), and
it is introduced in Section 4.4.
In the framework presented here, the conditional probability of
such a critical accident scenario is evaluated by a node called
damage extent signiﬁcant (des), which, for a given case study, yields
Pdes¼0.15. As this variable is quantiﬁed on the basis of an
assumption, the analysis of the effect of a change to the assump-
tion on the response of the framework is conducted at the
validation stage.
4.7. Ships stay separated after collision
A RoPax suffering signiﬁcant damage resulting from a collision
may experience the rapid ingress of water if the opening caused by
damage is exposed to high seas. This may occur if two ships that
collided remain separated after the collision, instead of the striking
ship having her forward part stuck in the side of the struck ship.
The probability of these two ships being apart is governed by a
function binding the following variables: collision speed, collision
angle signiﬁcant, and collision mass ratio (cmr), through the
following Heaviside function:
sss¼ 1 ANDðV ðA;BÞ41:2Vrupture; cmro1; αsign ¼ 1Þ
0 otherwise

ð8Þ
The probability of such a situation for the case study presented
here equals Psss ¼ 0:94. As this variable is based on assumptions, an
analysis of the effect of changes in the assumptions on the results
of the framework is carried out.
4.8. Capsize resulting from ﬂooding
The framework developed here assumes that a RoPax will
capsize if the collision speed is higher than the limiting speed
for the given ship and given collision scenario, the damage is
signiﬁcant, the two ships that have collided are separate after the
collision and the stability limit is exceeded for a given stability
conditions. Otherwise, the ship is not expected to capsize. The
probability of this event is evaluated by the node called ship
capsizing as a resulting of ﬂooding, using the following formula:
PCflooding ¼
Pcapsize ANDðdes¼ 1; sss¼ 1Þ
0 otherwise

ð9Þ
where Pcapsize is determined through Eq. (6). The probability of a
RoPax capsizing as a result of ﬂooding for the case study presented
here yields PCflooding ¼ 0:018.
4.9. Time to capsize because of ﬂooding
The time to capsize (TTC) is a relevant factor when it comes to
the evaluation of the success of the evacuation of the ship once
catastrophic ﬂooding is experienced. This framework recognises
this parameter, and for the case study presented, we use a
probabilistic model based on the results of numerical simulations
by Spanos and Papanikolaou in [10]. The model that is applied
here reﬂects their ﬁndings, where the probability of the ship
capsizing within 30 min of the damage event equals 0.8 and
reaches 0.95 within 60 min. Therefore, the following function is
adopted to determine TTC:
TTC ½min ¼ expðλÞ ð10Þ
where λ¼0.05, and the distribution is truncated at TTC¼180 min,
see [10].
4.10. The probability of a ship capsizing in dead ship condition
Another type of consequence arising from an open sea collision
is a ship capsizing as a result of wave and wind action, where the
ship is in dead ship condition (DSC). DSC means “a condition in
which the entire machinery installation, including the power supply,
is out of operation and the auxiliary services for bringing the main
propulsion into operation and for the restoration of the main power
supply are not available;” see also [71]. This phenomenon is
dependent on the ship type, and thus the hull shape, and weather
conditions. Thus, for the purpose of this case study, simulations
are performed to obtain the probability of a RoPax capsizing as a
result of DSC using the state-of-the-art, six-degrees-of-freedom
(6-DoF) ship dynamics model; see [72]. The probability of the ship
capsizing is assumed to be equal to the probability of a particular
angle of roll being exceeded, in this case 601. To calculate the
probability of this roll angle being reached – PCDSC – Monte Carlo
simulations are applied:
PCDSC ¼
Nϕc
Ns
ð11Þ
where NϕC means the number of simulations in which the roll
angle that would lead to the ship capsizing was reached, and NS is
the overall number of trials.
Table 4
The capsize bands and likelihood functions applied in the model.
Hcritical (m) Likelihood functions ðPcapsizeÞ and corresponding capsize bands
Pcapsize ¼ 0 (m) Pcapsize ¼ Sð0;1Þ (m) Pcapsize ¼ 1 (m)
2.0 0–1.3 1.3–2.8 42:8
2.5 0–1.5 1.5–3.4 43:4
3.5 0–2.0 2.0–4.8 44:8
5.5 0–3.5 3.5–7.2 47:2
Table 5
The wave statistics for the Baltic Sea including the GoF, [70].
Wave height (m) Probability of occurrence
0–1 0.345
1–2 0.390
2–3 0.185
3–4 0.062
4–5 0.015
5–6 0.003
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The 6-DoF model assumes that the overall ship response is a
sum of linear and non-linear parts. Such a division is a result of the
fact that the linear calculating methods are well known, and the
hydro-mechanical radiation and diffraction forces are well pre-
sented by linear formulae. The main part of the ﬁrst-order load is
calculated with a linear approximation (added mass, damping
coefﬁcient), with the actual heading and placement with respect
to the waves being considered, whereas the following are con-
sidered to be the non-linear parts: Froud–Krylov forces, restoring
forces and non-linearity resulting from motion equations.
For the case study that is analysed, the probability of a
RoPax capsizing, given the collision followed by DSC, yields
PCDSC ¼ 2:0 104.
4.11. Time to capsize as a result of DSC
The ship dynamics model mentioned in the previous section
simulates ship motions in the time domain. Thus, for each event
associated with a ship capsizing, the time instants of this event are
recorded. Monte-Carlo simulations are applied to evaluate the
fractions of cases where a ship capsizes, and thus the distribution
of the time instants taken a ship to capsize as a result of DSC is
obtained. This is considered as an input variable to the risk
framework. A log-normal distribution is used for modelling this
parameter, where, μ¼8.0 and s¼5.7, as follows:
TTCDSC ½min ¼ ln N ðμ;s2Þ: ð12Þ
4.12. Machinery damaged
The occurrence of DSC is governed by the unavailability of the
ship's main propulsion or steering. The probability of the ship's
propulsion and steering systems being damaged as a result of an
accident is determined by the node called machinery damaged,
given a RoPax being hit in the section housing the steering devices
or main engine (steer-me) and having her inner hull ruptured (ihr).
However an assumption is made about a 50% chance of the main
propulsion or the steering gear failing as a result of the collision
impact only, even if the inner hull is not ruptured. The probability
for machinery damage is calculated with the following formula:
Pmd ¼
1 ANDðihr¼ 1; steerme¼ 1Þ
0:5 ANDðihr¼ 0; steerme¼ 1Þ
0 otherwise
8><
>: ð13Þ
It is assumed that the length of the section accommodating the
propulsion is 0.2 LOA, and thus stree-me is modelled as follows:
steerme¼ 1 IfðUniformð0;10Þ48Þ
0 otherwise

ð14Þ
The probability of the machinery being damaged as a result of a
collision for the case study analysed here yields Pmd¼0.16. At the
stage of the validation of the framework, the effect of the changes
in the above assumptions on the results of the framework is
examined.
4.13. The probablity of loss of life and accident response
Two means of responding to an accidental collision to a RoPax
are considered in this framework. First, a ship salvage operation
with the use of tugs is considered in a case where a ship that has
been in a collision experiences DSC but no ﬂooding occurs. Second,
an ordered evacuation of a ship takes place if there is serious
ﬂooding following the collision. If the response time (resp) is
shorter than the hazard exposure time (haz), namely the time to
capsize as a result of ﬂooding or DSC following a collision, such a
situation is considered as a success. Otherwise, the response is not
effective and loss of life (LL) can be expected. The following
Heaviside function is applied to determine this parameter:
LL¼
0; haz=resp41
1; haz=respo1
(
ð15Þ
For the case study presented here, the loss of life can be expected
in 82 out of 100 cases in which a ship is ﬂooded. In the cases in
which a ship capsizes as a result of DSC, this ratio is even higher,
and equals 98 out of 100.
To obtain the annual probability for loss of life resulting from a
ship capsizing as a result of collision, the following conditional
functions are adopted:
PLLj capsizing j collision ¼ PLLPCfloodingPcollþPLLPCDSCPcoll ð16Þ
Additionally, the rate of fatalities with respect to a total number of
people on board is derived, which results in a number of fatalities
per year. This, together with the probability for the loss of life,
determined through Eq. (16), leads to a cumulative density
function of the number of fatalities. The latter is called F–N and
it is considered as an outcome of this framework.
In the following sub-sections, simpliﬁed models addressing
accident response are introduced. Also an approach for modelling
the rate of fatalities is shown.
4.13.1. The rate of fatalities and number of fatalities
In a case where the accident response is not effective (LL¼1),
the number of fatalities (N) is estimated. This parameter is one of
the most relevant for the risk framework, and should be modelled
as accurately as possible. However, as a result of a lack of
information regarding the relationship between the assumed
explanatory variables, namely time to capsize, evacuation time,
number of passengers on board the ship and the response variable N,
it is difﬁcult to deﬁne a precise model predicting N. Therefore,
conservative assumptions are adopted in this study. Such a choice
can be justiﬁed by the aim of this paper, which is to introduce a
framework for risk assessment, showing its abilities for efﬁcient
reasoning and instantaneous updating in the light of new knowl-
edge, rather than delivering the “true numbers” for risk. Thus, N is
assumed to be inversely proportional to the ratio haz/resp and the
number of passengers on board as follows:
N¼ ð1ðhaz=respÞÞNpassengers ð17Þ
where 1ðhaz=respÞ is considered as the rate of fatalities.
Although this assumptions appears straightforward, the results
obtained are comparable with the accident statistics, as presented
in Fig. 9 and discussed in Section 5.4.
4.13.2. The time needed for evacuation of a RoPax
Assuming an ordered evacuation of a ship in danger, the time to
evacuate the ship (TTE) is modelled with the use of triangular
distributions following the IMO recommendations, and a distinc-
tion is made between day and night; see [73]. Additionally, an
assumption is made regarding the effect of challenging weather
conditions on the evacuation time, in a fashion presented in the
following equation:
TTE¼
T1; Day and wave heighto3 m
T2; Night and wave heighto3 m
T3; Day and wave height43 m
T4; Night and wave height43 m
8>><
>>:
ð18Þ
where T1¼ ½20;20;40; T2¼ ½20;40;40; T3¼ ½20;40;60; T4¼
½25;40;60 in minutes.
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4.13.3. The time needed for tugs
The time needed for tugs to arrive at the scene is based on the
location of the accident relative to the nearest shore rescue station
and possible weather conditions. The probable locations of an
open sea collision in the GoF in which a RoPax is expected to be
involved are obtained from the DMTS, and are depicted in Fig. 2.
Thus, the time needed for tugs to reach the scene varies from 1 to
3 h, given good weather conditions. In the event of bad weather
this time is increased by a factor of 1.5.
4.13.4. The number of passengers on board the ship
In the case study presented here, the number of passengers on
board the ship during a collision (Npassengers) is modelled by means
of triangular distribution, with a lower limit of 200, an upper limit
of 3000 and mode value of 900. The lower limit is an estimate for a
ship's crew and a minimal amount of passengers, whereas the
upper limit is an estimate of the maximum capacity of RoPax ships
cruising in the GoF. The mode value is based on the available data
published by ship operators regarding the total monthly volume of
passengers transported, see for example [74].
5. Risk framework validation
Once the framework structure and its parameters are deﬁned
and the results are obtained, we validate the framework by
performing four analyses, to determine the following:
1. the sensitivity of the framework to the stochastic parameters
(the sensitivity analysis);
2. the distribution of uncertainty across the framework (the
value-of-information analysis);
3. the sensitivity of the framework to changes in the assumptions
governing the framework (the inﬂuence analysis);
4. the agreement of the framework with the real-world conditions.
5.1. The sensitivity analysis
The sensitivity analysis is performed to identify the essential
variables which have the highest impact on the outcome of the
model. For this purpose, every conditional and prior probability in
the BBNs is systematically varied in turn while keeping the others
unchanged. This allows the effects on the output probabilities
computed from the network to be examined, see for example [40].
To determine the sensitivity of an output variable to a given
parameter of the model a sensitivity function is estimated for each
single variable. This sensitivity function describes outcome of the
model as a function of the parameter z, which takes the following
form:
z¼ pðY ¼ yi jπÞ ð19Þ
where yi is one state of a network variable Y, and π is a
combination of states for Ys parent nodes. The sensitivity function
takes a general form as follows, see [75]:
f ðzÞ ¼ ðc1zþc2Þ=ðc3zþc4Þ ð20Þ
where f(z) is the output probability of interest given observa-
tions, and c1…4 are the constants, which are identiﬁed based on
the model. The ﬁrst derivative of this function describes the effect
of minor changes in a variable on the output and is called the
sensitivity value. The sensitivity values were obtained using
dedicated tools, which are implemented in the software package
GeNIe, used for the development of BBNs presented here.
The results of the analysis indicate that the model is sensitive to
changes in the following nodes: stability conditions, collision mass
ratio, collision probability, capsizing as a result of ﬂooding and time to
evacuate a ship; see Table 6. In the case study presented here, we
attempt to tailor these variables to the speciﬁc ship type and location,
and evaluate them as accurately as possible using the methods
described in the previous sections. However, certain variables could
not be determined without ambiguity, e.g. evacuation time, and thus
the effect of those on the output of the framework is determined in
Section 5.3. The distributions for the nodes with a lesser impact on
the outcome of the framework are based on the generic data available
in the literature, natural laws and the authors' best judgement.
5.2. The value-of-information analysis
The value-of-information analysis identiﬁes the most informa-
tive variables, with respect to the output variable, determining the
variables among which the probability mass of the output is
scattered. For this purpose the concept of entropy is utilised,
which is a measure of the randomness of a variable; the higher the
randomness, the higher the entropy. The entropy H(X) of a discrete
random variable X, consisting of a number of states x, is deﬁned as
follows; see [76]:
HðXÞ ¼ ∑
x
pðxÞ lg pðxÞ ð21Þ
In a model, where the outcome variable is conditionally dependent
on a number of parental variables, the conditional entropy HðXjYÞ
needs to be applied. This is a measure of the uncertainty of X given
an observation of Y and is estimated using the following formulae;
see [76]:
HðX jYÞ ¼∑
y
pðyÞHðX jY ¼ yÞ ¼HðXÞ IðX;YÞ
IðX;YÞ ¼ ∑
ðx;yÞ
pðx; yÞ lg pðx; yÞ
pðxÞpðyÞ ð22Þ
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Fig. 9. A CDF describing the rate of fatalities obtained from the model (solid line)
plotted against the CDF reﬂecting historical data from 1987 to 2007 (dashed line).
Table 6
Results of the sensitivity analysis.
Variable name Maximum absolute sensitivity value
Stability conditions 0.02
Collision mass ratio 0.02
Collision probability 0.01
Capsizing as a result of ﬂooding 0.002
Time to evacuate a ship 0.0001
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where IðX;YÞ is the mutual information, which explains the
reduction in the entropy of a variable X by observing a variable
Y. Thereby, the variable Y to be observed next is the one that has
the maximum value of IðX;YÞ. The results of the value-of-
information analysis with respect to the model output are gath-
ered in Table 7. They reveal that the uncertainties of the output
variables are mostly explained by the distributions of the variables
named capsizing as a result of ﬂooding, collision probability, stability
conditions, time to evacuate a ship, inner hull rupture and collision
mass ratio. The remaining variables are less informative.
However, neither of these two analyses can be performed on a
model that contains either PPDs or a continuous variable. Thus, the
variables needed to be discretized prior to the analyses.
5.3. The inﬂuence analysis
The two analyses above provide an insight into the given BBNs,
comprising the given variables linked with certain likelihood
functions (LFs). However, if these functions are determined
ambiguously, as a result of unavailability of knowledge or limited
understanding of a given phenomenon (e.g. collision angle) or
limited resources (e.g. damage extent signiﬁcant, ships stay sepa-
rated, evacuation time), changes in the LFs may also affect the
results of the sensitivity and value-of-information analysis. Thus,
the inﬂuence analysis is performed, which aims at the quantiﬁca-
tion of the effect of changes in the assumptions on the outcome of
the framework and other relevant variables. The proposed risk
framework allows very effective inﬂuence analysis to be per-
formed, as the updating process of BBNs is instantaneous. In the
case study presented here, the following variables are subject to
the inﬂuence analysis: stability conditions, collision angle, collision
angle signiﬁcant, damage extent signiﬁcant, ships stay separated,
machinery damaged and time to evacuate a ship.
The parameters and the various deﬁnitions of them adopted for
the inﬂuence analysis are presented in Table 8. Then the frame-
work is evaluated for the number of possible combinations of the
given input parameters, and thus a set of results (FN) is
obtained. Then the medians and standard deviations of F for each
N are determined, and a 95% conﬁdence band around the mean
value is obtained. The results of the analysis are depicted in Fig. 10.
5.4. The agreement of the framework with the real-world conditions
Once the framework is deﬁned and the results are obtained,
they are compared with the available data on the risk and severity
of open-sea collisions in which RoPax ships were involved.
First, the F–N graph that was obtained is compared with the
graph based on the accident statistics; see Fig. 10. The latter is
obtained from the available accident data on RoPax ships for the
North–West European seas and is adapted from [18]. The obtained
F–N graph contains the accumulated values of the risk of a RoPax
capsizing as a result of ﬂooding or DSC, whereas the accident-
based graph covers all kinds of accidents (collision, grounding,
ﬁre). In general, an F–N can be considered as a suitable risk picture
reﬂecting the deﬁnition of risk as “an R set” given by Eq. (1), as it
comprises the probability of various levels of consequences (N)
along with the associated uncertainties expressed as a 95% con-
ﬁdence band. The results obtained show a good level of agreement
of the modelled data with the observed data for higher numbers of
fatalities. This can be explained by the fact that in the history of
RoPax accidents, the most severe cases were those accidents
associated with the ship capsizing as a result of the car deck
ﬂooding. However, none of the recorded capsizing accidents were
caused by a collision with another ship. Moreover, it should be
noted that the statistics-based FN represents the risk of all types
of accidents, not only collisions, which may be a reason for the
divergence of plots for a smaller N.
Second, the following three intermediate quantities are vali-
dated with the available data presented in [7,5,13,77]:
1. the conditional probability of the loss of a RoPax as a result of
ﬂooding: PCflooding;
2. the probability of serious damage given an open sea collision:
Pdes;
3. the rate of fatalities: 1ðhaz=respÞ.
The probabilities that are obtained with the use of the risk
framework presented here are continuous variables, following
certain, non-parametric distributions. However, for the purpose
of the validation and visualisation of the results, the average
values are used where necessary; see Table 9. The rate of fatalities
is taken as a distribution and compared with the distribution
obtained from the accidents statistics.
The average value of PCflooding obtained from the framework is
close to the results obtained from the model based on global
statistics, and to the results of analysis for the speciﬁc RoPax as
presented in [5,7]. However, the value of PCflooding delivered by the
risk framework introduced here is different from the results for a
Table 7
Results of the value of information analysis.
Variable name Mutual information
Capsizing as a result of ﬂooding 0.60
Collision probability 0.30
Stability conditions 0.30
Time to evacuate a ship 0.15
Inner hull rupture 0.10
Collision mass ratio 0.06
Table 8
Inﬂuence analysis set-up.
Variable name Deﬁnitions adopted
Stability conditions s s1; s2; s3; s4
Collision angle α Uniform(10,170); triangular(10,90,170)
Collision angle signiﬁcant αsign Uniform(45,135); uniform(20,160)
Damage extent signiﬁcant des 1:2Lstruct ; 1:4Lstruct
Ships stay separated sss f ðdesi ; αsignÞ, where i¼1,2,3
Machinery damaged md 0.1; 0.16; 0.25
Time to evacuate a ship TTE T1; T2; T3; T4 – see Section 4.13.2
Fig. 10. A risk picture obtained with the use of the risk framework developed in
this paper, for the Gulf of Finland (in blue), plotted against the historical data
(1978–1994) on the risk to RoPax ships in European waters (in red). (For
interpretation of the references to color in this ﬁgure caption, the reader is referred
to the web version of this paper.)
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speciﬁc RoPax operating in the Atlantic Ocean, as shown in [13], but
still of the same order of magnitude. The average value of Pdes is in
line with the corresponding probability of serious damage given
open sea collision, according to historical data, as compiled in [5].
Also, good agreement is found between two distributions describ-
ing the rate of fatalities, as depicted in Fig. 9. The distribution obtained
from the data is discreet, as it is based on 31 cases, as compiled in [77].
The distribution obtained from the model is continuous. The agree-
ment between these two can be seen especially for the rates between
0.3 and 0.5 and for the rate 0.9. According to the accidents statistics
[77] the probability of the rate of fatalities falling in the range (0.95–1),
given accidental ﬂooding, is 0.15. The BBNs-based model delivers a
number of 0.16 for the same range. Otherwise, the model presented
here tends to slightly overestimate this parameter for rates lower than
0.95. However, for precise calculation of this parameter, one may
adopt models simulating ship evacuation processes, which need
detailed description of ship interior, see for example [78–80]. Another
possibility is to use generic models, for instance [81,82], which require
high-level description of the arrangement of escape routes onboard a
ship. The results obtained from those models can be used for detailed
validation of the simpliﬁed approach proposed here.
Despite the simpliﬁcations adopted in the framework, the
results of the validation show that the presented BBNs-based
model provides sound estimations for all three parameters. As
these parameters are of high importance for the analyzed phe-
nomena, the above ﬁndings provide a basis for beliefs about
reliable output of the model. Ultimately the framework delivers
risk predictors for the analyzed scenarios which are in good
agreement with the available historical data.
6. Conclusions
This paper presents a framework for risk analysis and assess-
ment in maritime transportation systems, following the formal
requirements adopted and reﬂected by Eq. (1). The framework is
systematic, proactive and transferable. It utilises BBNs as medium
to express and propagate the background knowledge that is
available about the system being analysed. The BBNs applied here
combine discrete and continuous variables. This allows probabil-
istic relationships among the variables and complex dependencies
as well as fast propagation of information through the framework.
Moreover, the processes of incorporation of new knowledge or
new data into the framework and the quantiﬁcation of the effect of
changes in the assumptions on the outcome are very efﬁcient, as
the BBNs allow for instantaneous updating. This, together with the
sensitivity analysis and the value-of-information analysis,
increases the credibility of the results which are obtained, as the
distribution of knowledge, on which the framework is developed,
is presented. This, in turn, may help in determining the areas of
the framework which are either unknown or not understood well
enough, and have signiﬁcant effects on the outcome of the
framework, meaning that they need to be treated with caution.
Then, the framework is used for a case study, evaluating the
risk for an MTS operating in the GoF during the ice-free season
considering an open-sea collision, where a RoPax is struck by
another ship and the RoPax is lost as a result of hull rupture and
consecutive ﬂooding, or as a result of post-accidental propulsion
failure and exposure to high waves, resulting in capsizing. This
means that the other collision scenarios, such as a RoPax is a
striking ship and suffers signiﬁcant damages to her bow leading
ultimately to water ingress, are not considered here. Moreover, the
distribution of mass ratios of striking and struck ships accounts for
80% of trafﬁc in the GoF. The cases where the mass of a striking
ship is larger than 1.7 times that of a struck ship, which accounts
for less than 5% of the trafﬁc in the area, are not considered in the
numerical analysis. However, these ratios are included in the risk
framework, and their effects are conservatively estimated; extra-
polating ﬁndings for other ratios.
Additionally, four stability conditions of a RoPax that is struck
are anticipated, and it is assumed that they are equally likely. This
needs further investigation, as this is a sensitive parameter of the
framework introduced.
The results are valid within certain, predeﬁned boundary
conditions, but the modular nature of the risk framework allows
its continuous improvement and adaptation to various conditions.
Despite the simpliﬁcations and the assumptions made in the
framework, the results obtained are promising, and they show
good agreement with the available statistical or modelled data on
RoPax accidents operating around Europe.
However, this paper does not claim any “true numbers” for risk
in the Gulf of Finland, as the aim of the analysis presented is to
demonstrate the abilities of the framework for knowledge-based
risk assessment and proper reﬂection of uncertainties which are
inherent to any risk analysis. Further studies are desirable in order
to cover missing accident scenarios (e.g. grounding or ﬁres on
board RoPax) and to improve the areas of the framework which
are relevant, but about which proper background knowledge is
lacking (e.g. the number of fatalities resulting from a collision, the
extent of the damage resulting in catastrophic ﬂooding or the
collision speed and angle). Additionally, the framework allows the
effect of risk control options to be studied. Both direction reason-
ing make it possible to propagate the outcome backwards, which
can be utilised in a recommendation phase, pointing out the most
effective ways to make improvements. This is, however, beyond
the scope of this paper.
Nevertheless, the risk framework introduced here can be consid-
ered as a contribution to a concept of holistic risk modelling which can
be utilised at the stages of either ship design or operation.
7. Supplementary data
The model presented here is available from the data library
PANGAEA at: http://doi.pangaea.de/10.1594/PANGAEA.818516.
Table 9
Risk framework veriﬁcation, comparison of various models.
Parameter Value Limitations Reference
PCflooding 1.80102 valid for the speciﬁc RoPax vessel and location of this study
1.76102 accidents statistics-based model [5]
1.89102 valid for the speciﬁc RoPax vessel, supported by accidents data [7]
4.20102 valid for the speciﬁc RoPax vessel and location (the Atlantic Ocean) [13]
Pdes 1.50101 valid for the speciﬁc RoPax vessel and location of this study
1.60101 accidents statistics-based model [5]
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Table A1
Description of variables in the model.
Factor group Variable name Variable symbol Expression governing variable Primary data source
Collision parameters The probability of collision – per year per area Pcoll Unif(0.07, 0.007) [45,59], A
Collision speed V ðA;BÞ If(αo45, N(2.35,1.64), If(α4135, N(14.2, 5.53), N(10.86,8.26))) [45,60], S
Collision angle α Unif(10, 170) [60]
Striking location m If(Unifð0;10Þ48;1;0) A
Relative striking location r Unif(0.5,0.5) A
Collision mass ration cmr Logn(0.2548,0.7014) [45]
Limiting speed Vrupture Fðr; cmr;αÞ N
Inner hull rupture ihr If(VA;B4Vrupture ;1;0) C
Machinery damaged md If(And(ihr¼ 1;m¼ 1),1, If(And(ihr ¼ 0;m¼ 1),0.5,0)) A
Collision angle signiﬁcant αsign If(And(αo135;α445),1,0) [66], N
Damage extent signiﬁcant des IfðAndðihr¼ 1; cmro1:3;V ðA;BÞ47; αs ¼ 1Þ;1;0Þ C, A
Ships stay separated after collision sss IfðAndðV ðA;BÞ410; cmro1:1; αsÞ;0;1Þ C, A
Ship capsizing Weather W exp(1.1), where Wo1 stands for good, 1oWo2 moderate and W42 is bad [70]
DSC conditions DSC If(md¼0,0,1) C, A
Capsizing in DSC CDSC If(DSC¼1,Unif(1E-4,2E-4),0) N
Capsizing as a result of ﬂooding Cﬂooding IfðAndðdes¼ 1;1oWo2Þ,WmoderatenUnif(0,1), If(And(des¼1, W42, sss¼1),Wbad,0)) [6]
Time taken to capsize in DSC TTCDSC Logn(5.9948,0.6455)/60 (min) N
Time taken to capsize ﬂooding TTCﬂood exp(0.05) (min) [6]
Probability of loss of life – ﬂooding PLLjflood Cﬂooding
nLLﬂood C
Probability of loss of life – DSC PLLjDSC CDSCnLLDSC C
Probability of loss of life given collision and ﬂooding PLLjcolljflood PLLjflood
nPcoll C
Probability of loss of life given collision and DSC PLLjcolljDSC PLLjDSC
nPcoll C
Accident response Time of day T Binom(1,0.5); where 1 is day and 0 is night A
Evacuation time E IfðAndðT ¼ 1;Wo1Þ;Triangð20;20;40Þ; IfðAndðT ¼ 0;Wo1Þ; Triangð25;40;40Þ, [73]
,Triang(25,40,60)))
Distance from tugs' base D Unif(60,180) (min) [45]
Time for tugs TT If(Wo1:5,D,1.5D) C, A
Danger of loss of life – DSC LLDSC IfðEoTTCDSC ;0;1Þ C
Danger of loss of life – ﬂooding LLﬂood IfðEoTTCflood ;0;1Þ C
Ship capacity N Triang(200, 900, 3000) [74], A
The rate of fatalities – ﬂooding Fﬂood If(And(T¼1, TTCfloodo5), 1, If(And(T¼0, TTCfloodo10), 1, If(TTCflood4E, 0, 1TTCflood=E))) C, A
The rate of fatalities – DSC FDSC If(And(T¼1, TTCDSCo5), 1, If(And(T¼0, TTCDSCo10), 1, If(TTCDSC4E;0;1TTCDSC=E))) C, A
Results Number of fatalities given ﬂooding Nﬂood FﬂoodnN C
Number of fatalities given DSC NDSC FDSCnN C
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Appendix A. Detailed lists of all variables included in the
model and their sources
Table below contains all the variables included in the model.
The equations governing these variables are provided along with
the primary sources of data. If a variable is obtained through
literature study, the relevant materials are referred to. If a variable
is labelled with C it is simply conditional upon parent nodes only.
If a variable is annotated with A it allows assumptions. If a variable
is obtained through numerical analysis it is labelled with N and
with S if it is based on simulation.
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